

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANDREA C. SQUIER,) No. EDCV 06-1324-RC
Plaintiff,)
v.) OPINION AND ORDER
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,¹)
Commissioner of Social Security,)
Defendant.)

Plaintiff Andrea C. Squier filed a complaint on November 28, 2006, seeking review of the Commissioner's decision denying her applications for disability benefits. On May 30, 2007, the Commissioner answered the complaint, and on August 6, 2007, the parties filed a joint stipulation.

BACKGROUND

I

On April 28, 2004, plaintiff applied for disability benefits

¹ Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d)(1), Michael J. Astrue is substituted as the defendant in the action.

1 under both Title II of the Social Security Act ("Act"), 42 U.S.C. §
2 423, and the Supplemental Security Income program ("SSI") of Title XVI
3 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1382(a), claiming an inability to work since
4 January 1, 2002, due to mental problems, back aches, obesity, asthma,
5 and swollen feet, among other conditions. Certified Administrative
6 Record ("A.R.") 3, 62-64, 70. The plaintiff's applications were
7 denied initially and following reconsideration. A.R. 23-36. The
8 plaintiff then requested an administrative hearing, which was held on
9 January 24, 2006, before Administrative Law Judge Lowell Fortune ("the
10 ALJ"). A.R. 39, 232-66. On April 26, 2006, the ALJ issued a decision
11 finding plaintiff is not disabled. A.R. 12-20. The plaintiff
12 appealed this decision to the Appeals Council, which denied review on
13 October 11, 2006. A.R. 5-11.

14 15 II

16 The plaintiff, who was born on June 30, 1963, is currently 44
17 years old. A.R. 62. She has a high school education, and has
18 previously worked as a security officer and an orderly. A.R. 71-74,
19 77A-C, 259-61.

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21 On May 22, 2004, Louis Fontana, M.D., a psychiatrist,² examined
22 plaintiff, diagnosed her with amphetamine abuse (in early full
23 remission) and amphetamine-induced mood disorder with depressive
24 features, and determined plaintiff's Global Assessment of Functioning
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27 ² Although plaintiff has both physical and mental
28 complaints, she challenges only the ALJ's assessment of her
mental complaints.

1 ("GAF") was 70.³ A.R. 136-38. Dr. Fontana opined:

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3 [Plaintiff] should be able to perform simple and repetitive
4 tasks but could have difficulty with more detailed and
5 complex tasks. She should be able to accept instructions
6 from supervisors and interact with coworkers and the public.
7 She should be able to perform work activities on a
8 consistent basis. She should be able to maintain regular
9 attendance in the workplace and complete a normal workday
10 and workweek.

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12 A.R. 138.

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14 On July 20, 2004, nonexamining psychiatrist Kevin Gregg, M.D.,
15 opined plaintiff did not have a severe mental impairment, and
16 determined she had "mild" restrictions in her activities of daily
17 living, no difficulties maintaining social functioning or
18 concentration, persistence or pace, and she had never experienced an
19 episode of decompensation. A.R. 155-68. On November 4, 2004,
20 nonexamining psychiatrist Michael Skopec, M.D., reaffirmed Dr. Gregg's
21 opinions. A.R. 194.

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23 On August 18, 2004, a registered nurse at the Riverside County
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25 ³ A GAF of 61-70 indicates "[s]ome mild symptoms (e.g.,
26 depressed mood and mild insomnia) or some difficulty in social,
27 occupational, or school functioning (e.g., occasional truancy, or
28 theft within the household), but generally functioning pretty
well, has some meaningful interpersonal relationships." American
Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders, 34 (4th ed. (Text Revision) 2000).

1 Department of Mental Health examined plaintiff, diagnosed her with an
2 unspecified mood disorder and polysubstance abuse (in remission) and
3 determined plaintiff's GAF was 46.⁴ A.R. 183-90. On October 12,
4 2004, Maureen Terrazano, M.D., diagnosed plaintiff with an unspecified
5 mood disorder and a history of polysubstance dependence (in remission)
6 and determined plaintiff's GAF was 56.⁵ A.R. 178-80, 185, 191. On
7 November 9, 2004, Dr. Terrazano reported plaintiff complained of
8 auditory hallucinations that did not influence her actions or
9 behavior, and determined plaintiff's memory and judgment were intact,
10 her thoughts were clearly organized and ruminative, and her attitude
11 was pleasant, but she was experiencing depression, anxiety, decreased
12 energy, isolation and social withdrawal and showed flattened affect.
13 A.R. 195. Dr. Terrazano opined that although plaintiff could interact
14 appropriately with family members, she could not: maintain a sustained
15 level of concentration; sustain repetitive tasks for an extended
16 period; adapt to new or stressful situations; or interact appropriate-
17 ly with strangers, co-workers, supervisors or authority figures. Id.
18 On January 20, 2005, Dr. Terrazano determined it was necessary to rule
19

20 ⁴ A GAF of 46 means that the plaintiff exhibits "[s]erious
21 symptoms (e.g., suicidal ideation, severe obsessional rituals,
22 frequent shoplifting) or any serious impairment in social,
23 occupational, or school functioning (e.g. no friends, unable to
24 keep a job)." American Psychiatric Ass'n, Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 34 (4th ed. (Text
Revision) 2000).

25 ⁵ A GAF of 56 indicates "[m]oderate symptoms (e.g., flat
26 affect and circumstantial speech, occasional panic attacks) or
27 moderate difficulty in social, occupational, or school
28 functioning (e.g., few friends, conflicts with peers or co-
workers)." American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 34 (4th ed. (Text
Revision) 2000).

1 out whether plaintiff had bipolar disorder or major depression with
2 psychotic features, and determined plaintiff's GAF was 67. A.R. 197-
3 98. Dr. Terrazano opined that although plaintiff's behavior was
4 within normal limits and her memory was intact, she still complained
5 of auditory hallucinations, although these were improved with
6 medication, she was still unstable at times, and she was experiencing
7 anxiety. Id. Dr. Terrazano further opined plaintiff's anxiety
8 limited her activity and could distract her, and plaintiff's auditory
9 hallucinations could affect her reliability and persistence, would
10 probably affect her ability to make simple work-related decisions, and
11 would prevent her from completing a 40-hour work week without
12 supervision. A.R. 198.

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14 Medical expert David Glassmire, Ph.D., a clinical psychologist,
15 testified at the administrative hearing that plaintiff has an
16 unspecified mood disorder, depression and methamphetamine abuse (by
17 history), and these conditions do not limit plaintiff's activities of
18 daily living, cause mild difficulty in plaintiff maintaining social
19 functioning and mild deficiencies of plaintiff's concentration,
20 persistence or pace, and have caused plaintiff no episodes of
21 decompensation. A.R. 237-49. Dr. Glassmire opined plaintiff should
22 be limited to simple repetitive tasks with no more than frequent
23 contact with co-workers or supervisors and occasional public contact
24 and no responsibility for the safety of others or operating any
25 dangerous machinery due to her history of substance abuse. A.R. 239-
26 40.

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1 cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1122 (1996); Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273,
2 1289 (9th Cir. 1996).

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4 The Commissioner has promulgated regulations establishing a five-
5 step sequential evaluation process for the ALJ to follow in a
6 disability case. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. In the **First Step**,
7 the ALJ must determine whether the claimant is currently engaged in
8 substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b).
9 If not, in the **Second Step**, the ALJ must determine whether the
10 claimant has a severe impairment or combination of impairments
11 significantly limiting her from performing basic work activities. 20
12 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). If so, in the **Third Step**, the ALJ
13 must determine whether the claimant has an impairment or combination
14 of impairments that meets or equals the requirements of the Listing of
15 Impairments ("Listing"), 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, App. 1. 20
16 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d). If not, in the **Fourth Step**, the
17 ALJ must determine whether the claimant has sufficient residual
18 functional capacity despite the impairment or various limitations to
19 perform her past work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(f), 416.920(f). If not,
20 in **Step Five**, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show the
21 claimant can perform other work that exists in significant numbers in
22 the national economy. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g), 416.920(g).

23
24 Moreover, where there is evidence of a mental impairment that may
25 prevent a claimant from working, the Commissioner has supplemented the
26 five-step sequential evaluation process with additional regulations
27 addressing mental impairments. Maier v. Comm'r of the Soc. Sec.
28 Admin., 154 F.3d 913, 914 (9th Cir. 1998) (per curiam). First, the

1 ALJ must determine the presence or absence of certain medical findings
2 relevant to the ability to work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520a(b)(1),
3 416.920a(b)(1). Second, when the claimant establishes these medical
4 findings, the ALJ must rate the degree of functional loss resulting
5 from the impairment by considering four areas of function: (a)
6 activities of daily living; (b) social functioning; (c) concentration,
7 persistence, or pace; and (d) episodes of decompensation. 20 C.F.R.
8 §§ 404.1520a(c)(2-4), 416.920a(c)(2-4). Third, after rating the
9 degree of loss, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has a
10 severe mental impairment. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520a(d), 416.920a(d).
11 Fourth, when a mental impairment is found to be severe, the ALJ must
12 determine if it meets or equals a Listing. 20 C.F.R. §§
13 404.1520a(d)(2), 416.920a(d)(2). Finally, if a Listing is not met,
14 the ALJ must then perform a residual functional capacity assessment,
15 and the ALJ's decision "must incorporate the pertinent findings and
16 conclusions" regarding plaintiff's mental impairment, including "a
17 specific finding as to the degree of limitation in each of the
18 functional areas described in [§§ 404.1520a(c)(3), 416.920a(c)(3)]."
19 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520a(d)(3), (e)(2), 416.920a(d)(3), (e)(2).
20

21 Applying the five-step sequential evaluation process, the ALJ
22 found plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since
23 her alleged onset date. (Step One). The ALJ then found plaintiff has
24 the severe impairments of spinal disorder, obesity, unspecified mood
25 disorder, with some depressive features, and methamphetamine abuse (by
26 history) (Step Two); however, she does not have an impairment or

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1 combination of impairments that meets or equals a Listing.⁶ (Step
 2 Three). The ALJ next determined plaintiff is not able to perform her
 3 past relevant work. (Step Four). Finally, the ALJ concluded
 4 plaintiff can perform a significant number of jobs in the national
 5 economy; therefore, she is not disabled. (Step Five).

6 7 IV

8 A claimant's residual functional capacity ("RFC") is what she can
 9 still do despite her physical, mental, nonexertional, and other
 10 limitations. Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d 453, 460 (9th Cir. 2001);
 11 Cooper v. Sullivan, 880 F.2d 1152, 1155 n.5 (9th Cir. 1989). Here,
 12 the ALJ found plaintiff retains the RFC for "work between the
 13 sedentary⁷ and light exertional levels"⁸ in that:

14
 15 ⁶ In reaching this conclusion, the ALJ found plaintiff has
 16 no limits in her activities of daily living, mild difficulties
 17 maintaining social functioning and concentration, persistence or
 pace, and she has had no episodes of decompensation. A.R. 19.

18 ⁷ "Sedentary work involves lifting no more than 10 pounds
 19 at a time and occasionally lifting or carrying articles like
 20 docket files, ledgers, and small tools. Although a sedentary job
 21 is defined as one which involves sitting, a certain amount of
 22 walking and standing is often necessary in carrying out job
 duties. Jobs are sedentary if walking and standing are required
 occasionally and other sedentary criteria are met." 20 C.F.R. §§
 404.1567(a), 416.967(a).

23 ⁸ "Light work involves lifting no more than 20 pounds at a
 24 time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to
 25 10 pounds. Even though the weight lifted may be very little, a
 26 job is in this category when it requires a good deal of walking
 27 or standing, or when it involves sitting most of the time with
 28 some pushing and pulling of arm or leg controls. To be
 considered capable of performing a full or wide range of light
 work, you must have the ability to do substantially all of these
 activities." 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b), 416.967(b). "[T]he full
 range of light work requires standing or walking for up to two-

1 [She] is able to lift 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds
2 frequently. In an 8-hour workday, [she] is able to stand 2
3 hours and sit 6 hours. [She] is occasionally able to climb
4 ramps/stairs, balance, bend, stoop, crouch, and kneel/squat.
5 She is unable to crawl or climb ladders, scaffolds, [or]
6 ropes. The [plaintiff's] gait is normal, but she walks
7 slowly. [She] should avoid moderate exposure to vibration
8 and all exposure to working at unprotected heights or around
9 dangerous or fast-moving machinery. She should also avoid
10 all exposure to dusts, fumes, odors, gases or chemicals.
11 [She] can perform simple repetitive tasks with occasional
12 contact with the general public. She is able to frequently
13 interact with coworkers. She should not have any
14 responsibility for the safety of others.

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16 A.R. 19. However, plaintiff contends the ALJ's RFC determination, and
17 ultimate decision, are not supported by substantial evidence because
18 the ALJ failed to properly consider Dr. Fontana's opinion that she
19 would have difficulty with more detailed and complex tasks. Jt. Stip.
20 at 3:28-4:2. There is no merit to this contention.

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22 In reviewing Dr. Fontana's opinions, the ALJ specifically held
23 that Dr. Fontana "concluded that the claimant could perform simple and
24 repetitive tasks but she would have difficulty with more detailed and
25 complex tasks. . . ." A.R. 17. More importantly, in assessing
26 plaintiff's RFC, the ALJ limited plaintiff to simple repetitive tasks,

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thirds of the workday." Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450, 1454
n.1 (9th Cir. 1984); SSR 83-10, 1983 WL 31251, *6.

1 A.R. 19, which is entirely consistent with Dr. Fontana's opinions.
 2 Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1216 (9th Cir. 2005). Thus,
 3 contrary to plaintiff's contention, Dr. Fontana's opinion provides
 4 substantial evidence to support the ALJ's RFC determination and
 5 assessment of plaintiff's mental impairment. Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d
 6 625, 632 (9th Cir. 2007); Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1149
 7 (9th Cir. 2001).

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10 At Step Five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show the
 11 claimant can perform other jobs that exist in the national economy.
 12 Hoopai, 499 F.3d at 1074-75; Widmark v. Barnhart, 454 F.3d 1063, 1069
 13 (9th Cir. 2006). To meet this burden, the Commissioner "must
 14 'identify specific jobs existing in substantial numbers in the
 15 national economy that [the] claimant can perform despite her
 16 identified limitations.'" Meanel v. Apfel, 172 F.3d 1111, 1114 (9th
 17 Cir. 1999) (quoting Johnson v. Shalala, 60 F.3d 1428, 1432 (9th Cir.
 18 1995)). There are two ways for the Commissioner to meet this burden:
 19 "(1) by the testimony of a vocational expert, or (2) by reference to
 20 the Medical Vocational Guidelines ["Grids"] at 20 C.F.R. pt. 404,
 21 subpt. P, app. 2."⁹ Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1099 (9th Cir.

23 ⁹ The Grids are guidelines setting forth "the types and
 24 number of jobs that exist in the national economy for different
 25 kinds of claimants. Each rule defines a vocational profile and
 26 determines whether sufficient work exists in the national
 27 economy. These rules represent the [Commissioner's]
 28 determination, arrived at by taking administrative notice of
 relevant information, that a given number of unskilled jobs exist
 in the national economy that can be performed by persons with
 each level of residual functional capacity." Chavez v. Dep't of
 Health & Human Servs., 103 F.3d 849, 851 (9th Cir. 1996)

1 1999); Widmark, 454 F.3d at 1069. However, "[w]hen [the Grids] do not
2 adequately take into account [a] claimant's abilities and limitations,
3 the Grids are to be used only as a framework, and a vocational expert
4 must be consulted." Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 960 (9th Cir.
5 2002); Widmark, 454 F.3d at 1069.

6
7 Hypothetical questions posed to a vocational expert must consider
8 all of the claimant's limitations, Thomas, 278 F.3d at 956, and "[t]he
9 ALJ's depiction of the claimant's disability must be accurate,
10 detailed, and supported by the medical record." Tackett, 180 F.3d at
11 1101. Here, the ALJ asked vocational expert Stephen M. Berry the
12 following hypothetical question:

13
14 I'm going to ask you to assume a person of the same age,
15 education and work background as the [plaintiff]. Assume
16 this person retains the [RFC] for a full range of light work
17 except for the following additions and[/]or limitations.
18 This person's able to lift 20 pounds occasionally, ten
19 pounds frequently, is able to stand and[/]or walk a total of
20 two out of eight hours, is able to sit a total of six out of
21 eight hours. This person is occasionally able to climb
22 ramps and stairs, is not able to climb ladders, scaffolds
23 and ropes. Is occasionally able to balance, stoop, crouch,
24 kneel and squat, is not able to crawl. This person's gait
25 is normal, but she does walk at a slow pace. **And mentally,**
26 **this person is able to perform simple, repetitive tasks.**

27
28 (citations omitted).

1 **This person is able to frequently interact with co-workers**
2 **and occasionally interact with the public. And this person**
3 **should not have any responsibility for the safety of others.**

4 . . . This person should avoid even moderate exposure to
5 vibration and should avoid all hazards such as dangerous or
6 fast[-]moving machinery and unprotected heights. . . . And
7 in addition, this person should avoid all exposure to fumes,
8 odors, dust, gases and chemicals. All right, based upon
9 these circumstances, could this person . . . perform any
10 other work in the regional or national economy?

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12 A.R. 261-62 (emphasis added). The vocational expert responded that
13 such an individual could perform a significant number of jobs in the
14 regional and national economy, including work as an addresser
15 (Dictionary of Occupational Titles ("DOT")¹⁰ no. 209.587-010), a
16 cutter and paster (DOT no. 249.587-014), and a document preparer (DOT
17 no. 249.587-018). A.R. 261-64. Based on this testimony, the ALJ
18 found at Step Five that plaintiff could perform other jobs in the
19 regional or national economy and, thus, is not disabled. A.R. 18-20.
20 However, plaintiff contends the ALJ's Step Five determination is not
21 supported by substantial evidence because: (a) the hypothetical
22 question to the vocational expert was incomplete since it did not
23 include Dr. Fontana's opinion that plaintiff would have difficulty
24 performing more detailed and complex tasks, Jt. Stip. at 9:14-21;
25 and (b) the vocational expert identified jobs inconsistent with

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27 ¹⁰ The DOT is the Commissioner's primary source of reliable
28 vocational information. Johnson, 60 F.3d at 1434 n.6; Terry v.
 Sullivan, 903 F.2d 1273, 1276 (9th Cir. 1990).

1 plaintiff's RFC, which require reasoning levels beyond the simple
2 repetitive tasks plaintiff can perform. Jt. Stip. at 11:3-14:7.
3 There is no merit to either of these contentions.
4

5 Regarding the first contention, the ALJ's hypothetical question
6 to the vocational expert is entirely consistent with Dr. Fontana's
7 opinions, as discussed above. See Bayliss, 427 F.3d at 1217 ("The
8 hypothetical that the ALJ posed to the VE contained all of the
9 limitations that the ALJ found credible and supported by substantial
10 evidence in the record. The ALJ's reliance on testimony the VE gave
11 in response to the hypothetical therefore was proper.").

12
13 The DOT sets forth guidelines regarding the General Education
14 Development ("GED") required to perform various jobs or occupations,
15 among other features. The GED guidelines are subdivided into three
16 categories - reasoning development, mathematical development, and
17 language development - that are rated on a scale from 1 (lowest) to 6
18 (highest). U.S. Dep't of Labor, Dictionary of Occupational Titles,
19 1010-11 (4th ed. 1991). For instance, a reasoning development level
20 of "1" requires an employee to "[a]pply commonsense understanding to
21 carry out simple one- or two-step instructions" and "[d]eal with
22 standardized situations with occasional or no variables in or from
23 these situations encountered on the job"; whereas, a reasoning
24 development level of "6" requires an employee to "[a]pply principles
25 of logical or scientific thinking to a wide range of intellectual and
26 practical problems[,] " to "[d]eal with nonverbal symbolism (formulas,
27 scientific equations, graphs, musical notes, etc.) in its most
28 difficult phases[,] " to "[d]eal with a variety of abstract and

1 concrete variables[,]” and “[a]pprehend the most abstruse classes of
2 concepts.” U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Dictionary of Occupational Titles,
3 1010-11 (4th ed. 1991).


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5 The document preparer position (DOT no. 249.587-018) has a
6 reasoning level of “3,” which requires an employee to “[a]pply
7 commonsense understanding to carry out instructions furnished in
8 written, oral or diagrammatic form” and to “[d]eal with problems
9 involving several concrete variables in or from standardized
10 situations[,]” and the addresser position (DOT no. 209.587-010) and
11 cutter and paster position (DOT no. 249.587-014) both have a reasoning
12 development level of “2,” which requires an employee to “[a]pply
13 commonsense understanding to carry out detailed but uninvolved written
14 or oral instructions” and to “[d]eal with problems involving a few
15 concrete variables in or from standardized situations.” See U.S.
16 Dep’t of Labor, Dictionary of Occupational Titles, 180, 219, 1011 (4th
17 ed. 1991). To the extent plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s finding she
18 has the ability to perform the document preparer job, she is correct.
19 A reasoning level of 3 is inconsistent with a limitation to simple
20 repetitive work. See, e.g., Hackett v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1168, 1176
21 (10th Cir. 2005) (A limitation to simple and routine work tasks “seems
22 inconsistent with the demands of level-three reasoning.”); Estrada v.
23 Barnhart, 417 F. Supp. 2d 1299, 1303-04 (M.D. Fla. 2006) (jobs
24 requiring reasoning level of 3 exceed claimant’s limitation to simple
25 interactions and tasks). On the other hand, plaintiff’s challenge to
26 the ALJ’s findings that she has the ability to perform the addresser
27 and cutter and paster positions is without merit. Plaintiff’s
28 limitation to simple, repetitive tasks is not inconsistent with the

ability to perform jobs with a reasoning level of two. See, e.g.,
Hackett, 395 F.3d at 1176 ("[L]evel-two reasoning appears . . .
consistent with . . . Plaintiff's inability to perform more than
simple and repetitive tasks. . . ."); Meissl v. Barnhart, 403 F. Supp.
2d 981, 984-85 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (plaintiff who could perform "simple
tasks . . . at a routine pace" could perform jobs with reasoning level
of 2); Flaherty v. Halter, 182 F. Supp. 2d 824, 850-51 (D. Minn. 2001)
("The ALJ's limitation for the Plaintiff, with respect to an
appropriate reasoning level, was that she could perform work which
involved simple, routine, repetitive, concrete, tangible tasks.
Therefore, the DOT's level two reasoning requirement did not conflict
with the ALJ's prescribed limitation. Although the DOT definition
does state that the job requires the understanding to carry out
detailed instructions, it specifically caveats that the instructions
would be uninvolved - that is, not a high level of reasoning.
Plainly, the VE testimony did not contradict the ALJ's limitation,
when considered in light of the DOT definitions."). Thus, substantial
evidence supports the ALJ's Step Five determination that plaintiff can
perform a significant number of jobs in the regional or national
economy, Osenbrock v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1157, 1163 (9th Cir. 2001);
Meanel, 172 F.3d at 1115, and plaintiff is not disabled.

ORDER

IT IS ORDERED that: (1) plaintiff's request for relief is denied;
and (2) the Commissioner's decision is affirmed, and Judgment shall be
entered in favor of defendant.

DATE: June 24, 2008


ROSALYN M. CHAPMAN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE